Notes

n.1Mañjuśrī praising the Buddha in The Ornament of the Light of Awareness. anālayaṃ yathākāśaṃ niḥprapañcaṃ nirañjanam | ākāśasama­citto 'si nirālamba namo 'stu te || 13 ||

n.2etacchrutamayodāra­jñānālokādyalaṃkṛtāḥ | dhīmanto'vatarantyāśu sakalaṃ buddha­gocaram ||4.79||

n.3It is by now common to translate prajñā as “wisdom,” and more precise alternatives (such as “superior cognition”) may appear cumbersome or odd. However, it is useful to keep in mind that prajñā is also a synonym for abhidharma (a higher understanding of the dharmas), dharma­pravicaya (the grouping or analysis of the dharmas), and of vipaśyanā (special insight into the nature of things). This also helps explain the sūtra’s interest in discrete classifications, especially in the last sections.

n.4[...] śūnyatālakṣaṇā anutpannā aniruddhā [...] See Vaidya 1961, p. 98. Note also that “noncessation, nonarising” are the first words of Nāgārjuna’s Mūla­madhyamaka­kārikā; the Jñānālokālaṃkāra is quoted in Candrakīrti’s commentary to the “Examination of the Tathāgata” section, where emptiness (hence, nonarising and noncessation) is the logical ground to prove the fundamental equality between the Tathāgata and all the dharmas. The same quote appears in Kamalaśīla’s commentary to the Vajra­cchedikā, and in Rongzom Mahāpaṇḍita’s explanation of dharmatā­yukti (reasoning in terms of the nature of the dharmas). See Köppl 2008, p. 117.

n.5JAA, below.

n.6A number of Indian and Tibetan masters have referred to the JAA to highlight that, from the perspective of the nonarisen dharmatā, there is no difference between the buddhas and anything else.

n.7The question of the precise difference between jñāna and vijñāna is of course complex. Jñāna can be either a synonym of vijñāna, or a synonym of prajñā, or‍—and this is the sense that we are referring to in the present context‍—a nonreferential, liberating “awareness.” The structure of the Sanskrit words helps in remembering the intended sense: vijñāna is the cognition of a point of reference or object (viṣaya-prativijñapti). What is absent in jñāna is the point of reference or object (the vi). Within the context of the JAA, when referring to an exalted or desirable state, we always find jñāna and never vijñāna: “These bodhisattvas have come looking for awareness” (samāgateme bahu­bodhi­sattvā jñānārthinaḥ); “Mañjuśrī, you should rely on awareness” (jñāna­pratisaraṇena ca te mañjuśrīr bhavitavyam); “They wish for a buddha’s awareness […]” (te buddha­jñānābhilāṣiṇo); “They dedicate their roots of merit toward obtaining the tathāgata-awareness” (kuśala­mūlaṃ tathāgata­jñāna­prati­lambhāya pari­ṇāmayanti); “Awareness is explained as the entrance in the sameness of the three times” (jñānam ucyate | tryadhva­samatāvatāraḥ sarva­dharmeṣu); “For those endowed with attachment to form, Mañjuśrī, the eye is attachment; the awareness of the nature of form and the eye is nonattachment” (rūpa­saṅga­saṃyuktānāṃ mañjuśrīś cakṣuḥ saṅgaḥ | rūpa­cakṣuḥ­prakṛti­jñānam asaṅgaḥ); “Awareness precedes all your actions, and you are free of any point of reference: I bow to you!” (anābhoga­pravṛtto 'si sarva­doṣa­vivarjitaḥ / jñāna­pūrvaṅgamā ceṣtā nirālamba namo 'stu te). “Awareness” thus seemed the English term that (like jñāna) best covers both the cognition of objects, as well as soteriologically more crucial types such as the “nonconceptual awareness beyond the world” (lokottara­nir­vikalpa­jñāna) and so forth.

n.8Vyākhyā on Ratna­gotra­vibhāga 1.5. Whether we consider the verses and commentary as the work of the same author or not, it does not seem necessary to term the Vyākhyā a commentary, since its terminological choices make it clear that this is how it presents its own relationship to the root verses.

n.9Ratna­gotra­vibhāga 1.5: asaṃskṛtam anābhogam apara­pratyayoditam | buddhatvaṃ jñāna­kāruṇyaśaktyupetaṃ dvayārthavat. Strictly speaking, the Vyākhyā quoting the JAA in this section relates to the following explanatory verses as well, and starts after verse 8.

n.10The quotations as found in the Vyākhyā differ from the precise wording of the JAA as we have it, but some differences are clearly due to textual corruptions, while others may indicate a different manuscript tradition. It is clear, in any case, that the passages are meant as quotations and not mere paraphrases.

n.11The Ratna­gotra­vibhāga inverts the order of the last two analogies.

n.12See Almogi 2009.

n.13See Prasannapadā on MMK (De la Vallée Poussin 1913: 12.16) and also Kamala­śīla’s commentary on the Vajra­cchedikā, in the glosses preceding the sentence “all dharmas are Buddha­dharmas” (sarva­dharmā buddha­dharmā iti).

n.14See Study Group on Buddhist Sanskrit Literature 2004b, p. 87.

n.15See Sferra 2006.

n.16The Tibetan translation of this verse in the Sekoddeśa­ṭīkā differs from the Degé Kangyur. Notably, the Degé version translates jñāna with mkhyen pa, while the translators of the Sekoddeśa­ṭīkā used ye shes. See also Sferra 2006, p. 173.

n.17See Tatz 1987.

n.18Advaya­vajra­saṃgraha: Pañcatathāgata­mudrā­vivaraṇa (p. 25); Caturmudrā (p. 34); Amanasikārādhāra (p. 60).

n.19This is particularly true of the writings of Rongzom Mahāpaṇḍita (rong zom mahāpaṇḍita, eleventh century). See Köppl 2008 and Almogi 2009.

n.20Vaipulya could refer to a category of teachings, the Mahāyāna as a whole, the Ratnakūṭa as a whole, or specifically, the Kāśyapa­parivarta.

n.21It appears that nāyakāḥ is here singular (the verses are not in classical Sanskrit and plurals in āḥ are attested even by Edgerton). The Tibetan has only ’dren pa; hence, it does not force us to take it as plural.

n.22The manuscript transcription has bhagavāṇ rather than the edited text’s Bhagavat . We prefer the first vibhakti reading for syntactical reasons.

n.23Translation based on the Tibetan.

n.24“With joined palms” according to the Tibetan.

n.25Translation based on the Tibetan.

n.26Translation based on the Tibetan, which suggests the Sanskrit could have been mityātvaniyata­santānānāṃ satvānāṃ kāye.

n.27It seems that tataḥ here means “from that,” which the gender indicates as referring to “that jewel.”

n.28We have here translated vijñapti as “intimation,” as it seemed the only possible term to capture both possible senses of coming to know an object (viṣaya­prati­vijñapti) and vocal or bodily information (vāg­vijñapti, kāya­vijñapti).

n.29The Tibetan adds “and nonceasing” (ma ’gags pa).

n.30Translation based on the Tibetan.

n.31Compare this passage to chapter 2 of the Mūla­madhyamaka­kārikā; the force of the passage is precisely in its elliptic reference to taking movement and abiding as an empty, interdependent pair.

n.32We are here following the Tibetan, that would plausibly correspond the following Sanskrit sentences: tathatā nāmocyate | tattvārthādhi­vacanam etat | tattvam nāmocyate tathataiva | | tathatā­tattvam tathatvam ucyate | This is an explanation of synonyms and etymology. Tathatā could be rendered as ‘thusness’; tattva as ‘thatness’ (both the suffix –tā and –tva have a similar value in Sanskrit). Tathatva would again be ‘thus-ness’, but here the sūtra explains that it is rather a phonetic abbreviation of tathatā + tattva . The difficulty of this passage is that the available Sanskrit text needs to be emended following the Tibetan, while the Tibetan translation does not distinguish phonetically between the suffix –tā and the suffix –tva (making the implied etymological abbreviation difficult to perceive). Hence, this is a good example of a passage where we need both the Sanskrit and Tibetan texts to offer a plausible reading.

n.33This reading follows the Tibetan, which has de kho na nyid, probably translating the Sanskrit tattvam. The transcribed manuscript has kham.

n.34The passage starting here and continuing down to 1.­95 is closely paralleled in The Teaching on the Great Compassion of the Tathāgata (Tathāgata­mahā­karuṇā­nirdeśa, Toh 147) from 2.204 to 2.229.

n.35In Yogācāra texts, abhūta­parikalpa is taken as a sixth vibhakti tatpuruṣa, rather than a karma­dhāraya. “What is not there” is the pair of perceiver/perceived (grāhya/grāhaka); hence it is not “false imagination,” as abhūta does not function as a qualifier for parikalpa. See the first chapter of the Madhyānta­vibhāga­bhāṣya for a representative instance.

n.36The Sanskrit here is nanatvam but the Tibetan reading, tha dad pa nyid med pa, clearly makes more sense.

n.37We believe that here pratibhāsopama does not mean “comparable to the appearance of” but rather it is both pratibhāsa and upamā‍—a “similitude” and a “comparison”; it is an emphatic restatement through synonym, not uncommon in sūtras.

n.38This section might appear counterintuitive. However it becomes more comprehensible when we keep in mind that the eye is the basis (āśraya) and visible form is the point of reference (ālambana) that make the arising of visual consciousness possible.

n.39The reading of the transcribed manuscript is manasi rather than 'manasi and is consistent with the Tibetan.

n.40The Tibetan nang yongs su shes pa ni dag pa o suggests that the Sanskrit should be adhyātma­parijñā śuddhiḥ. The edited text has adhyātmaḥ pari­śuddhiḥ, and the manuscript transcription has adhyātma pari­śuddhiḥ.

n.41The Sanskrit has svabhāva but the following phrases suggest that the Tibetan reading (implying asvabhāvo) is preferable.

n.42The passage on awakening that is paralleled in Toh 147 (see n.­34) ends here.

n.43The Tibetan suggests punar aparaṃ mañjuśrī bodhisattvo dānaṃ ca bodhiś ca sattvāś ca tathāgataś cādvayam etad advaidhīkāram. The Tibetan also contains byang chub sems dpa’ before sbyin pa and all the other pāramitās; however, the Sanskrit text does not contain bodhisattva in any of those instances. It seems that in this case, the Tibetan translators may have been using a different text.

n.44Here the Tibetan differs, suggesting perhaps māra­nāma­samati­krāntaḥ and dharma­saṁkalpaṁ viditvā. The expression dharma­dhātu­gatiṁgataḥ appears in the Mañjuśrī­nāma­saṁgīti.

n.45Here the Tibetan differs. It reads theg pa’i rgyal mtshan kun tu btsugs, which would correspond to something like yāna­dhvaja­samucchritaḥ, or “having well raised the banner of the vehicle.”

n.46Here the Tibetan differs. It would perhaps suggest avāraṃbanaṃ avālamba sarva­cittāna mohana | anāvaraṇa­dharmo’si nirālamba namo’stu te. The verse may appear odd, but it becomes perhaps more comprehensible when we recollect that a mind (citta) needs a point of reference (ālambana) in order to exist in the first place (a point of significant importance for the whole sūtra).

n.47Here the Sanskrit text seems rather corrupt. Following the Tibetan, we would propose vandāmi satva­samāvāsa pi gatam | sarvāsu gatīṣu vivikta­mānasam.